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This paper reviews theories that identify motives for mergers, reviews recent empirical 
research, specifies a model that incorporates alternative motives, and tests the model with 
data from food  manufacturing mergers between  1979  and  1986.  Results  suggest that 
capital markets are not efficient, and  that mergers are  not to  redress agency problems. 
Acquirers paid higher premiums for target firms that have recently had low profitability, 
and paid higher premiums  when the stock market was low.  The model explains at best 
30 percent of the variation in premiums, suggesting that major explanations for mergers 
remain as  yet unidentified. MOTIVES FOR MERGERS IN FOOD MANUFACTURING 
I.  Introduction 
Industrial organization economists have evaluated merger activity,  here defined to  include 
friendly mergers and  acquisitions, hostile takeovers,  and leveraged buy-outs, by analyzing the 
ex post performance of the merged firms.  Ravenscraft and Scherer, for example, report "on 
average, profitability declines and efficiency losses resulted" after the conglomerate merger wave 
of the 1960 and 1970s.  However, they clearly state  "we must be cautious in imputing motives 
from  results  (Ravenscraft  and  Scherer,  p.  212).  This  paper  directly  analyses  motives  for 
merger. 
Event studies constitute a second major conceptual approach to the analysis of mergers.  that 
at first seem to analyze motives.  However, the correspondence is not exact.  Corporate finance 
economists analyze the impact of a merger "event" upon the stock price performance of target 
and  acquiring  firms  (Fama,  et  al.;  Jarrell  et  al.).  If one  assumes  that capital  markets  are 
efficient, then changes in the valuation of firms represent efficiency gains and such gains may 
very well be motives for merger.  They may be due to  synergy between the merging firms  or 
the elimination of agency problems- Le., good management replacing bad. 
Jarrell et al.  report that event study analysis of the mergers during the 1980s confirm work 
on  prior  merger  waves  as  reported  by  Jensen  and  Ruback.  Target  stockholders  gain  via 
premiums  paid.  Acquiring  firm  stockholders  gain  nothing,  and  often  subsequently  suffer 
declines in stock prices performance.  Jensen and Ruback noted that this subsequent decline in 
acquiring firms  stock price performance raises  disturbing questions about the  efficient capital 
market assumption. 
1 Scherer  has  recently  summarized  the  link  between  capital  market  efficiency  and  the 
efficiency interpretation of high merger premiums as  follows: 
Differential willingness to  accept the efficient markets axiom is  at the heart of much 
disputation between those  who  infer from event studies  that takeovers are efficiency-
enhancing and those who  are more skeptical. 
The skeptical view of takeovers advances an alternative explanation for the stock price 
behavior observed in merger event studies.  It is  well accepted that stock prices move 
over  time  in  something  approximating  a  random  walk.  Companies  can,  therefore, 
become  targets  not  only  because  their  managers  have  erred  in  failing  to  maximize 
profits,  but  because  the  stock  market  has  erred,  randomly  (or  through  fad-like 
movements (Shiller, 1987)), setting share prices so low as to make their issuer a bargain 
worth snapping up.!  Random stock market valuation errors may also nominate likely 
acquirers,  for the company  whose  stock is  overvalued (and knows  it)  has  a uniquely 
economical currency with which to make acquisitions or raise the cash for making them. 
Thus, premiums may be paid to  gain control of undervalued companies even when no 
efficiency gains are expected to  result from the ownership change (Scherer, p.  72). 
Whether observed stock price movements measure efficiency gains of the firms  involved, 
or corrections to  an inefficient capital market,  is a question that has important implications for 
public policy as well as strategy formulation by large firms. The acquirers motjves are distinctly 
different under these alternative scenario.  This paper analyzes motives for merger by examining 
the premium that an acquirer pays over the market valuation of the firm two months prior to the 
acquisition.  We argue that this  premium may  be more directly correlated with measures that 
identify acquirers motives. 
II.  Model Specification 
Event studies  are single  variable  studies,  and  as  such examine only  changes  in the  stock 
market valuation of a target or acquired firm due to merger.  Following Halpern and others this 
J  Merger-makers often behave, or at least claim to  behave,  as  if the efficiency axiom were untrue. 
They search actively for "bargain" companies to acquire.  For numerous examples,  see Ravenscraft and 
Scherer pp. 9-10.  (This footnote is  part ofthe quote.) 
2 paper will  analyze  the motives  for mergers  by  moving beyond  the  traditional event study  to 
develop a model that analyzes the determinants of the premiums paid for target companies.  This 
exercise sheds light on alternative theories of corporate control and capital market efficiency. 
Dependent Variable 
Merger premium (PREM2M):  is defined as the percentage amount that the acquirer's offer 
price is  above the target price two months prior to  the announcement date.  The choice of the 
40 day  cutoff is  consistent with much of the  literature.  Asquith, for  example,  observed that 
stock prices begin to move, possibly in response to  information leakage or speculation as much 
as  40 days before the event date. 
This study analyzes acquirer's offer price rather than the market price of the target's stock 
on the announcement date because, given our interest in motives for merger, we are interested 
in what an acquiring firm will pay  for a target company,  not the  stock market's valuation of 
what the firm will pay.  The announcement date target stock price may not shift immediately to 
the offer price for several reasons.  The market may  think the deal will not go  through.  The 
market may think that higher bids may appear.  The payment terms of the offer (cash, securities, 
long  term  debt)  may  influence  market  valuation.  Finally,  the  acquirer  may  have  more 
information  than  the  market.  Hirschey  has  documented  the  role  of  asymmetric,  inside 
information in the merger process. 
Event studies control for general movement in the value of all stocks (fIrms) by removing 
such systematic variation to produce a measure of excess or abnormal or unsystematic returns 
to a stock over the event window (2 months in this study).  Typically, betas for target stocks are 
estimated in a capital asset pricing model to  make this adjustment (Copeland and Weston,  Ch 
3 7;  Pinkerton p.  28-30).  Since many  of the  food  mergers analyzed here are not listed on the 
major exchanges, price information over time is  not readily available to estimate betas.  Using 
unadjusted  premiums, however,  seems  acceptable.  The  average  two  month premium in the 
sample  is  49.4 percent and  the  average change  in  the  S &  P 500 stock price during the  two 
month event window for the sample is only 2.3 percent.  To the extent that betas are similar for 
food manufacturing firms the CAPM adjustment would be uniform across the sample and affect 
only the model's intercept tum.  Also to  the extent that the betas are  low,  changes in general 




SP 500 is the level of the Standard and Poors Stock Index at the merger announcement date. 
The  general  level  of the  stock  market  is  hypothesized  to  be  negatively  related  to  merger 
premiums  because  stocks  generally  are  undervalued  in  a  low  rather  than  a  high  market. 
Alternatively, if the stock market is efficient there, should be no relationship between premiums 
and the level of the market. 
ROEAVG:  The target's return on equity is  an average for the two most recent fiscal years 
prior  to  the  merger.  If the  market  undervalues  firms  with  poor  short  term  earnings  and 
acquirers  recognize  this,  then  merger premiums  should  be  negatively  related  to  ROEAVG. 
Alternatively, if the market is efficient, then there should be no relationship between premiums 
and ROEAVG. 
2  We did compute the standard event study measure of excess returns for the 37 targets using CRSP 
data and found that the model explains significantly less variation in excess returns.  This is  consistent 
with  our  argument  for  analyzing  offered  premiums  rather  than  stock  market  valuation  or  the 
announcement day (Pinkerton p.  83). 
4 ROE and ROECHNG are target return on equity the year prior to the announcement and the 
change in ROE from year, t-2 to t-1.  These variables are an alternative to ROEAVG.  Firms 
with low ROE in year t-l are hypothesized to have higher premiums.  Herman and Lowenstein 
as  well as  Ravenscraft and Scherer report that target profits are often on the rebound prior to 
merger.  ROECHNG is  hypothesized to  have a positive effect on the premium. 
LOBTEQ  is  the  ratio  of total  long  term debt  to  total  equity.  A  negative  coefficient  is 
expected for two reasons.  First, acquiring firms may seek targets with low debt levels so that 
leverage can finance the merger.  Second, Jensen's free cash flow theory suggests that low debt 
firms lack close oversight by  capital markets and thus tend to  have higher agency costs (poor 
management).3  The  merger  process  disciplines  "poor"  management.  "Good"  managers 
compete and pay a premium for low debt (poorly managed) firms.  As Scherer explained, this 
hypothesis assumes that the capital market is efficient. 
WORKCAP:  Net working capital is  defined as current assets minus current liabilities, and 
as  such  is  a  measure  of a  firm's  cash  position.  To  the  extent  that  the  market  does  not 
incorporate  excess  working  capital  into  stock  prices,  such  target  ftrms  will  have  higher 
premiums.  Liquidity also may be attractive to  acquirers because it can be a source of finance 
for the merger. 
HTO  is  a  binary  variable  with  value  one  indicating  a  hostile  takeover  and  value  zero 
indicating a friendly merger or acquisition.  A hostile takeover is  hypothesized to  command a 
3  Taken at face value, Jensen's theory suggests that the optimal capital structure of a firm consists 
of 100 percent debt.  However, he extends the theory by observing that the cost of debt increases with 
its  level  because risk,  via bankruptcy cost,  increases.  The optimal  debt level will  occur at the point 
where the marginal cost of debt (bankruptcy cost) equals its marginal benefit (reduction in agency costs) 
(p.  324). 
5 higher  premium because,  according  to  Marris  and  Manne,  the  market for  corporate control 
removes incumbent managers who are  not maximizing the value of the firm.  Acquirers must 
pay  a  higher  premium  than  would  be  necessary  in  a  friendly  situation  to  offset  incumbent 
management resistance and  influence with the target firm share holders. 
LBO is a binary variable with value one indicating a leveraged buy-out by management and 
zero  a friendly  merger.  Managers that  go  LBO  may  have  recognized  their own prior poor 
management and/or the market's shortfall in valuing their company.  Since managers have inside 
information  on  the  magnitude  of the  valuation  gap  that  they  do  not  necessarily  share  with 
directors  who  represent outside stockholders,  we  hypothesize  that the  LBO  premium will  be 
lower than that which would occur in a friendly merger. 
OWNER is  the percentage of the  targets outstanding common equity held by  officers and 
directors.  Target firms with more disperse ownership may yield higher the premiums (Connor 
and  Geithman,  Ferris  et  al.).  There  are  two  reasons  for  this.  First,  with  more  disperse 
ownership  there  is  a  larger number  of non-marginal  stockholders.  The  transactions  cost  of 
assembling a controlling interest in the target will be higher.  A second reason is that the board 
of a firm with dispersed management may be acting a rubber stamp, and may not be acting to 
maximize shareholder wealth. 
INSIDE is the percent of board positions held by managers.  If  a firm's board is dominated 
by  officers  and  top  managers,  then  there  also  may  be  divergence  from  shareholder  wealth 
maximization, and such firms will command a higher premium. 
HORIZ,  VERT,  and RELATE are three binary  variables that identify horizontal,  vertical 
and  related  as  opposed  to  purely  conglomerate  mergers.  To  the  extent  that  they  measure 
6 synergies,  efficiencies or market power gains they  are expected to  have a positive impact on 
premiums. 
NBIDS  is  the  number  of bids  made  prior  to  the  accepted  offer.  Weiss  explains  how 
"winners  curse"  may  force  premiums up  in a bidding  war.  Varaiya  also  hypothesized  and 
reported that the presence of other bidders increased merger premiums (p.  176-178). 
CONSID is  a binary variable that identifies mergers that use stock possibly in conjunction 
with cash to purchase target stock shares.  Melicher and Nielson suggest that this practice may 
inflate premiums. 
m.  Empirical Results 
Data for this study were purchased from the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) database and 
are for 1979 to  1986.  The data identify all targets publicly traded on the major exchanges or 
over the counter (OTC) market in SIC 20 (food and kindred products) where the total value of 
the  acquisition  exceeded  $25  million.  It is  not  necessary  that  the  merger  be  ultimately 
consummated, although all but four were.  Firm-specific financial data used in the computation 
of  ROEAVG,  ROE,  ROECHNG,  LDBTEO,  and  WORKCAP  were  collected  from  the 
COMPUSTAT  data  base,  lO-K  forms,  Moody's  Industrial  Manual,  and  Moody's  O.T.C. 
manual.  Information on firm ownership (OWNER, INSIDE) was collected from the Moody's 
manuals, Value Line Investment Survey, and purchased from the CDA Investment Technologies 
data  service.  Data for  the  market index  variable  (SP500)  were  obtained from  Standard and 
Poor's Statistical Service.  NBIDS and the binary variables HORIZ, VERT, and RELATE were 
constructed from information on primary and secondary four digit SIC codes provided by M&A. 
Additional information came from descriptions of business activities provided by M&A and other 
7 news sources.  Information for the construction of HTO, LBO, and CONSID was obtained from 
a description of deal terms provided by M&A and the Wall Street Journal. 
Table  1 provided the  mean,  range,  and  standard deviation for  each of the  dependent and 
independent variables  in the  data set.  There are  53  observations on each variable except for 
OWNER (51  observations).  The average premium was 0.4944, indicating that acquirers offered 
on average 49 percent more than the  target's market price 40 days  before the  announcement. 
The average target long term debt ratio  (LDBTEQ) was  0.5591.  One firm (Associated Coca 
Cola Bottling Co.) reported no  long term debt in the year prior to  the merger.  Table 1 also 
shows  that  the  average  number  of bids  (NBIDS)  was  1.24,  with  a  maximum  of five.  In 
addition, officers and directors (OWNER) held an average of 18 percent of target stock, and on 
average 35  percent of board seats were held by  top managers (INSIDE). 
The mean value for the binary variables represent the proportion of the sample for which that 
variable carries a value of one.  The mean value of HORIZ, for example,  indicates that 15.09 
percent of the mergers were horizontal.  Additionally,  the variable CONSID indicates that all-
cash  transactions  composed  79.25  percent  of the  deals,  while  the  remaining  20.75  percent 
involved the exchange of cash and stock. 
Table 2 reports regression results.  In equation 1 the stock market trend variable,  SP500, 
has  a negative coefficient and  is  significant at the one percent level.  The stock market,  thus, 
appears to  be inefficient.  When the stock market is  low (high),  acquirers are willing to  pay a 
high (low) premium because the difference in the firms market and  "warranted"  value is  high 
(low).  A  similar  result  holds  for  two  year  return  on  equity  (ROEAVG).  Premiums  are 
significantly higher (one percent level) on low profit firms.  Target long term debt equity ratios 
8 Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
VARIABLE  N  MEAN  MIN  MAX  STD DEV 
PREM2M  53  0.4944  0.0127  1.3937  0.3036 
SP500  53  157.1154  100.2100  252.8400  43.4263 
ROEAVG  53  0.1133  -0.3741  0.3367  0.1203 
ROE  53  0.0985  -0.5232  0.3557  0.1528 
ROECHG  53  -0.0296  -0.8591  0.2851  0.1649 
LDBTEQ  53  0.5591  0  3.4039  0.6853 
WORKCAP  53  0.2413  -0.1158  0.5485  0.1448 
HORIZ  53  0.1509  0  1  0.3614 
VERT  53  0.0566  0  1  0.2333 
RELATE  53  0.3396  0  1  0.4781 
HTO  53  0.2830  0  1  0.4548 
LBO  53  0.2075  0  1  0.4094 
CONSID  53  0.7925  0  1  0.4094 
NBIDS  53  1.2453  1  5  0.7313 
OWNER  51  0.1799  0.0004  0.6300  0.1960 
INSIDE  53  0.3532  0  1  0.1899 
9 Table 2.  Multiple Regression Analysis of Merger Premiums in Food Manufacturing: 
1979-1986 (t ratios in parentheses). 
2  3  4  5 
INTCPT  1.27846  1.27874  1.27948  1.28490  1.26687 
SP500  -0.00292  -0.00293  -0.00275  -0.00278  -0.00296 
(-3.442)a  (-3.405)a  (-3. 148)'  (-2.870)'  (-3.337)' 
ROEAVG  -1.07210  -1.10995  -0.96902  -1.19349 
(-2.766)'  -(2.767)'  (2. 152)b  (-2.931)' 
ROE  -1.07032 
(-2.721)' 
ROECHNG  0.54733 
(1.828c 
LDBTEO  -0.14155  -0.14051  -0.14657  -0.12845  -0.13856 
(-2.040)b  (-1.919)b  (2.033)h  (1.684)C  (1.931)h 
WORKCAP  -0.46871  -0.47049  -0.46752  -0.50246  -0.47926 
(1.718)C  (-1.692)<  (-1.694)C  (-1.535)  (-1. 715)C 
HTO  0.00395 
(0.044) 
LBO  -0.09827 
(-0.978) 
OWNER  0.01404 
(0.057) 
INSIDE  -0.06601 
(-0.282) 
NBIDS  0.00260 
(0.045) 
CONSID  -0.02700 
(-0.247) 
(-0.179) 
10 Table 2.  Continued 
2  3  4  5 
HORIZ  -0.02084 
VERT  -0.01293 
(-0.076) 
RELATE  0.10799 
(1.197) 
F  4.606"  3.609"  3.187b  1. 850
c  2.853b 
R2/adj R2  0.2774  0.2774  0.2937  0.2606  0.3073 
0.2172  0.2006  0.2015  0.1198  0.1996 
Significance levels:  a = 1 percent, b = 5 percent, c = 10  percent. 
are negatively related to premiums as  hypothesized and significant at the 5 percent level.  Low 
debt targets are self financing deals and possibly firms with high agency costs.  Working capital 
(WORKCAP)  has  a  negative  rather  than  hypothesized  positive  impact  on premiums  and  in 
marginally significant (10 percent level). 
Equation  2  specifies  ROE  and  ROECHNG  ill  lieu  of  ROEAVG.  They  perform  as 
hypothesized and are significant at the  1 and 5 percent level,  respectively.  Low profit firms 
receive higher premiums and those whose profitability is  increasing have higher premiums. 
Equation 3 adds the hostile takeover and leveraged buy-out binary variables to the model to 
test for agency costs impacts on premiums.  Neither is  significant. 
Equation 4 adds the stock ownership dispersion variable (OWNER) the degree of managerial 
control  on the  board  of directors  (INSIDE),  the  number  of bids  (NBIDS)  and  the  type  of 
payment (CONSID) to the basic model.  None are statistically significant. 
11 Equation 5  adds  the  merger types  binary  variables,  horizontal  merger (HORIZ),  vertical 
merger  (VERT)  and  related  merger  (RELATE).  None  of the  premia  of these  types  are 
significantly  different  from  those  for  the  benchmark  category  (conglomerate).  Buying 
conglomerates,  breaking them up, and selling business units possibly to  horizontal or vertical 
competitors appears to be an equally important motive for merger. 
Conclusions 
There was substantial variation in merger premia paid for food manufacturing firms during 
the boom years of the  1980s.  Stock market and  target firm financial  variables significantly 
affected merger premia.  Proxies for agency costs and market structure features explain virtually 
none  of the  variation in premia.  These  results  suggest that capital  market inefficiency,  not 
agency cost minimization, was the primary driving force behind the merger wave of the 1980s. 
Routine  stock  trading  by  investors  did  not value  certain types  of firms  at  their  "warranted" 
value.  Acquiring firms can and did pay substantial premiums for these undervalued firms during 
the 1980s. 
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